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Workload Leverage and the Effect on Audit Quality 
 
Abstract: Practitioners and regulators suggests audit quality is negatively associated with 
auditor workloads (PCAOB 2015). We examine the association between office-level workload 
leverage and an office’s audit quality from 2004-2015 for all accelerated filers. The increase in 
workloads during busy season can instigate cognitive fatigue (Cohen 1980) if not appropriately 
mitigated by adequately preparing audit professional’s expectations (Glass and Singer 1972). 
Our findings indicate that increased busy-season workloads are associated with lower audit 
quality for accelerated clients of Non-Big 4 audit firms, whereas Big 4 auditors with higher 
workload leverage provide lower audit quality for non-accelerated filers. These results provide 
support for cognitive fatigue for all audit firm sizes; however, different sized audit firms 
experience cognitive fatigue at different points during busy season. Our findings contribute to the 
literature examining workload leverage and auditor burnout by providing empirical evidence of 
office workload influencing the audit process differently for different office sizes.  
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fatigue 
  
1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A number of stressors in the professional setting can overstimulate individuals and affect 
their performance. In particular, within the accounting profession, one of the most prevalent 
stressors is the increased workload during busy season. The audit profession experiences 
seasonal stress resulting from temporary increases in workloads, “busy season”, in order to 
accommodate financial reporting deadlines for calendar yearend publicly traded companies.1 In 
the extreme instance, the overstimulation from high workloads can result in cognitive fatigue 
(Cohen 1980). However, this cognitive fatigue can be mitigated by the predictability and 
expectations of the increase on workload, which may cognitively prepare professionals and 
prevent cognitive fatigue (Glass and Singer 1972). The PCAOB and Center for Audit Quality 
(CAQ) have expressed concerns regarding audit workloads and whether they affect audit quality 
because audit personnel are audit firms’ largest asset and time is finite (Pfeffer 1998; Hanson 
2013; CAQ 2014). Using the ratio of total assets per audit personnel in an audit office, we 
examine the association between busy season audit workloads and audit quality at the office 
level.     
Survey and experimental studies indicate a negative relationship between audit quality 
and employee workloads (Persellin, Schmidt, and Wilkins 2015; Jones, Norman, and Wier 2010; 
Sweeney and Summers 2002; Fogarty, Singh, Rhoads, and Moore 2000; Sanders 1998). For 
example, Persellin et al. (2015) survey audit practitioners regarding busy season and the 
workload requirements and quote one practitioner saying, “I believe that after a couple of months 
of working 60+ hours, employees begin to get burned out, which results in reduced work quality. 
From my experience, when you are over worked, in a high stress environment, and you are not 
                                                          
1 64% of Compustat companies from 1950 through 2009 have a year end of December 31 (Lopez and Peters 2012).  
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getting enough sleep or exercise, and this continues for months on end, there is no possible way 
for you to be as productive, efficient, or sharp as you would be under normal circumstances. In 
this environment, decrease in quality of work is inevitable.” The PCAOB proposed auditor’s 
work leverage as an audit quality indicator because when resources are spread thin, it directly 
affects the inputs available for audits within an office (PCAOB 2015). Despite the anecdotal 
evidence and regulators’ interest in the effects of auditor’s workloads on audit quality, the audit 
literature currently does not consider the effect of workload at the office level. This association is 
crucial to investigate at an office level, as there are significant variations in audit quality for 
different offices of the same audit firm (Francis and Yu 2009).  
The accounting profession is particularly susceptible to periods of greater workloads as 
auditees with calendar year ends (December 31) have similar filing deadlines, which results in 
temporary increases in auditor workloads. An increase in workload during busy season is 
expected for auditors, but as busy season progresses, the ability to effectively maintain the 
quality of work may decrease due to audit personnel becoming overly stressed and tired, which 
decreases the ability to carry out complex and specific tasks (Cohen 1980). However, long hours 
are expected by audit professional and audit firms have invested a significant amount of effort 
and money to develop programs and initiatives aimed at providing employees work-life balance 
to combat the stressors associated with public accounting, including increased workloads (e.g., 
Buchheit, Dalton, Harp, and Hollingsworth 2016).  
Two conflicting theories explain how increased workloads may affect audit quality. 
Cognitive fatigue theory posits prolonged exposure to an environmental factor (i.e., increased 
workload), results in stress and may decrease auditors’ attention capacities (Cohen 1980). 
Cognitive fatigue would explain an overall decrease in audit quality due to the inability of audit 
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personnel performing audit tasks during this prolonged period of exposure to stressors. 
Prolonged exposure to stress from increased workloads may result in compromised audit 
procedures and impaired auditor judgment, which could affect the quality of the audit (Persellin, 
Schmidt, and Wilkins 2015; PCAOB 2015). The cognitive fatigue theory posits that stress 
resulting from circumstances, such as auditors becoming overworked from long hours, impairs 
the ability to perform demanding tasks (Cohen 1980). This possible effect of increased 
workloads is inherent to audit firms and seasonality dictated by client deadlines.  
On the other hand, the adaptive cost theory suggests the predictability of stressors (i.e., 
increases in workloads) mitigates the adverse effects of stress (Glass and Singer 1972). Thus, the 
predictability of increased workload during busy season may diminish the potential of auditors’ 
cognitive fatigue and would not result in lower quality of performance. The seasonality and 
predictability of the accounting profession present a unique setting to analyze the effects of stress 
associated with workloads (Herda and Lavelle 2012; Persellin et al. 2015).  
We use the intersection of Audit Analytics, Compustat, and data provided by Infogroup, a 
marketing firm specializing in business information, for 2005 through 2014 to examine the 
influence of office workload, using the ratio of total assets audited to the number of employees, 
on audit quality. We restrict the sample to calendar year end (e.g., December 31) companies 
required to have an external audit because these companies induce the busy-season effect. We 
measure audit quality using misstatements and missed internal control deficiencies.  
Overall, we find a positive association between the workload of an audit office and the 
likelihood of the financial statements being misstated for accelerated filers. These findings 
support auditors experiencing cognitive fatigue with greater workload leverages, which results in 
lower audit quality for busy season clients. More notably, we find Non-Big 4 and non-second-
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tier firms drive our results for accelerated filers, which may be due to Non-Big 4 audit firms 
being susceptible to staffing constraints. This finding may reflect the inability of smaller audit 
firms to reallocate staff as easily as larger audit firms do in order to manage each auditor’s 
utilization rate. For Non-Big 4 firms we find, on average, the odds of misstating the financial 
statements increase by 2.5% when the workload is increased by a standard deviation. We find a 
decrease in audit quality as audit workload increases for non-accelerated clients audited by Big 4 
firms, which may be indicative of a more prolonged busy season adversely affecting the audit 
quality. Overall, these results support the cognitive fatigue theory, which suggests greater 
exposure to stress and increased workloads is associated with decreased work quality.  
Our study contributes to several streams of accounting literature. First, we contribute to 
the literature that examines accountant workload by providing support that quality of auditor 
output decreases as the workload for employees increase. Our findings provide empirical 
evidence to regulators that are considering measures associated with audit quality and that may 
serve as indicators to audit committees and practitioners. Further, this study provides evidence of 
the necessity of audit firms developing and supporting alternative work arrangements to address 
employee turnover that may be due to cognitive fatigue. This study contributes to the literature 
that examines audit office characteristics that influence office audit quality by identifying 
another input to the audit production function. Finally, our study extends the audit literature that 
focuses on audit quality. We examine audit quality throughout the busy season period, rather 
than the entire calendar year. It is important to understand audit quality and determinants of audit 
quality in this period as over half of the public companies served by accounting firms have a 
calendar year-end. Concurrent deadlines for companies with December 31 year ends results in 
increases in audit firm workload to meet the deadlines. Our study suggests the increased 
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workload to meet client deadlines during busy season is associated with a negative effect on 
audit quality and is another defining difference between Non-Big 4, second-tier, and Big 4 audit 
firms.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section two provides a background and 
develops our hypotheses. Section three describes our sample and data, section four provides 
details of our research design. Section five discusses our results and additional analyses. Finally, 
section six concludes. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Literature Review 
There is a plethora of literature that considers employee burnout of professions and job 
outcomes (e.g., Almer and Kaplan 2002; Almer, Cohen, and Single 2003; Almer and Single 
2004; Cohen and Single 2001). Extreme work related stress can result in emotional exhaustion, 
depersonalization, and reduced personal accomplishment (Sweeney and Summers 2002; 
Freudenberger 1975) and can affect employee turnover rates, employee stress levels, and 
employee performance (Cordes and Dougherty 1993; Maslach 1982). Stress can be thought 
about on a continuum with burnout describing the extreme consequence of stress (Fogarty et al. 
2000). The inputs of audit tests and engagement team personnel directly affect the observable 
outcomes of the audit (Francis 2011). The quality of the inputs are not only a function of the 
ability of the auditor, but also the structure and environment of which the audit personnel exist.  
Thus, stress may affect auditors’ ability to provide high quality audits. 
Accounting research has focused on the effects of employee burnout and job outcomes 
(e.g., Guthrie and Jones 2012; Herda and Lavelle 2012). However, these studies examine 
outcomes other than performance (i.e., turnover intentions), or are experimental, and lack the 
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ability to empirically test the effects of workload on job performance. Modeling burnout using 
archival data becomes difficult due to data availability. For example, Fogarty et al. (2000) 
explores burnout within the accounting profession and the effect on the behavioral and attitudinal 
outcomes and suggests separate treatment variables are necessary for role conflict, role 
ambiguity, and role overload when examining burnout. Observable empirical measures of these 
variables do not exist for U.S. publicly traded companies. Thus, we first review the accounting 
literature considering workload and employee outcomes and then provide alternative theories 
that apply directly to the workload of busy season.   
The Effect of Workload on the Auditing Profession  
Auditors’ workloads increase substantially during busy season (i.e., the first quarter of 
the year – January through March) to meet simultaneous reporting deadlines of clients with 
calendar (or near) year-ends. Audit firms allocate a portion of the workload associated with 
meeting these reporting deadlines to an interim date (September through December) as well as 
utilizing outsourcing; however, local offices serving the client still perform a majority of the 
work during busy season. Sweeney and Summers (2002) provide evidence that auditor’s 
workload leverage surrounding filing deadlines induces auditor burnout, but whether the office 
workload influences audit quality is unknown. 
More recently, Chang et al. (2017) examine the effect of workload leverage at a national 
firm level and find a positive association between workload and the likelihood of the PCAOB 
reporting a deficiency during the firm’s triennial inspection. We improve upon this study by 
considering the effect of workload at the office level on an annual basis as opposed to the 
national level on a triennial basis and consider two different measures of audit quality. This 
distinction in measures and design choice are crucial, as Francis and Yu (2009) find variation 
7 
 
among Big 4 audit firm offices. Buchheit et al. (2016) also find variation in firm size and 
employee satisfaction when examining the effect of alternative work arrangements in combating 
employee dissatisfaction and work-life balance. Their study provides evidence that employees 
working for smaller public accounting firms have lower instances of burnout compared to 
employees working in industry. However, their study focuses on the perceptions of burnout and 
not the effect on performance or factors that may mitigate poor performance (i.e., review 
process) at larger accounting firms. Thus, it is necessary to consider the office level workload on 
the office audit quality and any factors that may potentially mitigate the adverse effect of 
workload. 
Herda and Lavelle (2012) use social exchange perspective to examine the effects of 
burnout and similarly find increased signs of auditor burnout positively associated with turnover 
intentions. However, this effect is moderated by perceived audit firm fairness, which one could 
argue busy season hours are perceived as necessary and fair as they are expected and clearly 
communicated to employees. Persellin et al. (2016) surveyed auditors and found the quality of 
work begins to diminish when they work only five hours above the forty hour-week threshold 
and the increased workload is partly due to internal constraints (i.e., meeting client deadlines and 
staffing shortages) as well as external constraints (i.e., PCAOB pressure). When faced with these 
circumstances that result in stress, audit procedures are compromised, audit judgment is 
impaired, and professional knowledge is difficult to retain, which results in lower audit quality.   
While workload leverage has negative effects on employee performance, there are a few 
factors that may mitigate this effect (i.e., healthy lifestyle, firm quality control initiatives). For 
example, Jones et al. (2010) find healthy lifestyles mitigate the result of stress progressing into 
burnout. Additionally, when audit firms experience growth, they are able to adapt and only 
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temporarily produce lower quality audits when an increase in the clientele occurs (Bills et al. 
2016). This ability of an audit office to adapt may be due to the ability to reallocate or hire 
additional human capital to accommodate busy season demands and meet client deadlines and 
maintain consistent audit quality.  
Prior literature emphasizes burnout within the auditing profession as an explanation for 
the association between workload and job outcome (i.e., turnover). The demands on auditors 
during busy season can lead to (1) employee burnout for auditors (Fogarty et al. 2000; Almer and 
Kaplan 2002), (2) poor auditor effort due to emotional exhaustion, and (3) a depersonalized 
approach to audit tasks (Sweeney and Summers 2002). The PCAOB’s Concept Release on Audit 
Quality (PCAOB 2015) expounds the relationship between workload and audit quality. There is 
concern that greater workload leverages may not allow adequate supervision and review of the 
audit process and audit judgements, which would reduce audit quality. The PCAOB recognizes 
sufficient time is necessary to audit quality and less supervision driven by higher workloads 
increases the risk of “less effective audits” (PCAOB 2015). Because stress levels do not have to 
escalate to the burnout level to affect employee performance and there are methods that mitigate 
the adverse effects of high workloads, we introduce two competing theories, cognitive fatigue 
and adaptive-cost, to better understand the effects of workload on auditors’ performance.2  
Cognitive Fatigue Hypothesis 
Schuler (1980) defines stress as a condition in which employees are faced with 
constraints when attempting to achieve tasks that work towards a known goal. The cognitive 
fatigue theory suggests as the load and duration of stressors increase the ability to adapt and cope 
with the stressors decreases. These increasing load and duration results in lower performance. 
                                                          
2 These two theories do not in any way minimize the burnout theory; however, the construct is broader in order to 
consider the progression and adaptability of stress over busy season.  
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The capacity to process tasks individually is also affected, which leads auditors to ignore specific 
client needs and provide a “check the box” audit (Daley 1979). This approach to coping with 
stimuli affects the quality of audit tasks as well as auditor judgment. Additionally, auditors 
experiencing prolonged exposure to increased workloads minimize their involvement with other 
team members and decrease the synergy among team members on an audit (Daley 1979).  
Adaptive-Cost Hypothesis 
 Glass and Singer (1972) discuss the notion of predictable and unpredictable stressors and 
their effects on performance. Broadbent (1979) found an association between stress and 
performance when conducting a human experiment using noise and the speed in which colors 
were named post-stimulus. However, this finding only persisted for the group that was not 
forewarned about the exposure to noise. The adaptive-cost hypothesis suggests individuals are 
more able to cope with stressors when they are predictable, and the adaption to stressors is what 
drives individuals’ performances (Cohen 1980). An adverse post-stimulus effect is often likely to 
occur only when the stressor is unpredictable. The predictability of stressors can be transferred to 
auditor’s experience with busy season, as auditors have months to prepare and anticipate the 
increased workload associated with busy season. The adaptive-cost theory suggests the 
knowledge and predictability of the increase in workload would mitigate any potential decrease 
in audit quality.  
Hypotheses Development 
The effect of the increase in workload auditors experience during busy season may result 
in the inability to cope with prolonged exposure to stress and result in decreased audit quality. 
The prolonged exposure to an increased workload may activate cognitive fatigue and result in 
auditors cutting corners, judgment being adversely affected, and turnover of competent staff, 
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which would directly affect the audit office’s quality of the audit. In addition, the increased 
workload could rise to the level not effectively managed by the current level of employees. 
Contrarily, the predictability and well-known occurrence of busy season may mitigate any 
negative effects of the stress associated with increased workloads through enhanced coping 
mechanisms. As the effect of an increased workload is unknown, we state the following null 
hypotheses:  
H1: Busy season office workload does not affect audit quality for calendar yearend clients. 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Variables of Interest 
 Our study examines the influence of the workload leverage of audit personnel on audit 
quality. To capture workload leverage of audit personnel, we use the ratio of total audit work to 
the accessibility of audit personnel for each audit office. H1 examines the office level workload 
and its influence on the overall audit quality of an office. We use an office level measure of the 
workload leverage by scaling the total assets audited by an office for all December year-end 
clients that are large accelerated filers or accelerated filers by the total number of audit personnel 
for the audit office (WorkLev_Office). Figures 1, 2, and 3 depict the winsorized distribution of 
WorkLev_Office for the full sample, Big 4 Sample, and Non-Big 4 Sample, respectively. These 
figures show the variables behaves close to a normal distribution with a smoother distribution for 
the offices of Non-Big 4 firms. 
<<<Insert Figures 1, 2, and 3 Here>>> 
Dependent Variables 
 Audit quality is a facet of financial reporting quality, and as the financial statements are a 
joint output of management and the auditors (Defond and Zhang 2014; Francis 2009; DeAngelo 
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1981); therefore, it is necessary to consider ex-post measures specific to the inputs of the audit 
firm. We consider two different measures of audit quality that are indicative of audit failures and 
predominately driven or influenced by the audit firm’s workload leverage, specifically 
restatements and missed internal control weaknesses.  
 Restatements are a strong signal of poor audit quality and indicate an audit failure 
(Christensen et al. 2015; Blay, Sneathen, and Kizirian 2007). The audit failure is the result of the 
auditors not appropriately managing the audit risk by varying the extent, nature, and timing of 
the audit procedures (i.e., detection risk). We define restatements as an indicator variable equal 
to one if the yearend period under audit is subsequently restated (Restatement). Similar to 
restatements, missed internal controls that surface in subsequent years related to the prior period, 
signal another type of audit failure. Higher quality audits are less likely to have missed internal 
control weaknesses (Rice and Weber 2012). Consistent with Rice and Weber (2012), we measure 
missed internal controls as an indicator variable equal to one (zero otherwise) when an internal 
control weakness related to a restatement is subsequently reported that relates to the current year 
(MissMW). 
 To capture the overall office level quality, we take the sum of Restatement and MissMW, 
by office and scale by total clients. This yields a proportion measure of restatements and missed 
material weaknesses at the office level reported as Restatement_Office and MissMW_Office, 
respectively.  
Empirical Models 
To test H1, we regress the two different measures of audit quality (AuditQuality) on the 
work leverage for the office and control variables. We estimate the following regression:  
AuditQualityi,t = β0 + β1WorkLev_Officei,t + βkControlsi,t + Year + εi,t (1) 
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Where the dependent variable is one of the office level measures of audit quality, 
Restatement_Office and MissMW_Office. The variable of interest is WorkLev_Office, which 
measures the workload leverage at the office level. We include as control variables 
characteristics of the clients that would affect the probability of restatement. All variables are 
measured at the office level to capture variation in client characteristics across clients. We 
include Competition as the natural log of the number of similarly-sized offices located in the 
same locale.3 We include Percent LAF and Avg_Days_Early to proxy for the reporting pressures 
of the office’s clients. Percent LAF is the measure of the percent of the office’s clients that are 
large accelerated filers. These clients have the earliest filing deadline, and are often the most 
complex clients. Avg_Days_Early captures the average number of days the office’s clients file 
earlier than their deadline. Early filers impose additional stress and pressure on the office 
engagement team. Avg_NAS_Ratio is a measure of the average non-audit fees scaled by total 
audit fees for the offices clients and represents a measure of reporting independence. We also 
include the average client age (Avg_Client_Age) and a Big 4 indicator variable. The remaining 
controls (Avg_ROA, Avg_MtoB, Avg_Disc_Accruals, Avg_Cash_Flow, Avg_Loss, 
Avg_Leverage, Avg_Litigation, Avg_M&A) are used to hold constant other client characteristics 
that influence the complexity of the financial statements, which may affect restatement rates. 
When including Restatment_Office as the audit quality measure, Avg_ICW is also included to 
control for the influence of an office’s internal controls on the likelihood of restating the 
financial statements (Rice, Weber, and Wu 2015). These controls variables are included in the 
                                                          
3 All office-level measures are done at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level. See 
http://www.census.gov/population/metro/  for more information regarding MSAs. The marketing firm database 
supplies rough approximations for office size in terms of employees. Competition is only considered if the office is 
in the same size category, one smaller, and one larger. 
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analysis as the average measure for the clients in an office.  
Sample Selection  
Our initial sample is an intersection of Compustat, Audit Analytics. We supplement these 
data with employee count data from Infogroup (www.infogroup.com), a marketing firm that 
specializes in providing information for business-to-business marketing such as direct mail and 
e-mail. This marketing firm uses several approaches to gathering data including a call center that 
calls each business directly to verify data gathered from public records such as state filings, 
utilities, and telephone directories. Exact employee headcounts are not available from the data; 
however, the marketing firm places each office location into one of nine size categories 
according to employee count. For example, the first three size categories are 1-4 employees, 5-9, 
employees, 10-19 employees. This continues through the last group, which is all offices with 
more than 1,000 employees. 
The sample period we analyze is 2005 to 2014 and all observations are required to have 
positive assets in Compustat, audit fee data and office location data in Audit Analytics, and 
relevant employee count data in the Infogroup database. Table 1 reports that for the roughly 
10,000 office years identified in Audit Analytics only 3,161 have enough data to be considered. 
Some smaller offices do not have accelerated filer clients yielding 2,979 office years for our 
analysis.  
<<<Insert Table 1 Here>>> 
To capture the busy season effect we limit the sample to companies with December 
yearends that qualify as large accelerated filers or accelerated filers. This ensures the clients of 
interest file 10Ks within the first quarter of the year and add to the busy-season workload and are 
required to have a SOX 404 audit. As the traditional busy season for audit personnel begins after 
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the December 31 year ends, we include year ends surrounding the traditional December 31 year 
end by two weeks, but consider the commencement of the traditional busy season is driven by 
clients with December 31 year ends. Our final sample consists of 2,979 audit office-year 
observations.  
IV. RESULTS 
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the sample of audit office-year observations. The 
summary statistics indicate the average (median) office has a seven (zero) percent restatement 
rate and five (zero) percent rate of missing internal control weaknesses.  
<<<Insert Table 2 Here>>> 
On average, audit offices in our sample issue the financial statements approximately six 
days prior to the deadline. Sixty-six percent of our sample are Big 4 audit firms and on average 
23 percent of the clients operate in litigious industries.    
Table 3 presents Pearson correlations among the variables in the multivariate analysis. 
<<<Insert Table 3 Here>>> 
The variable of interest, WorkLev_Office, is positively associated with the rate of 
misstatements in an office. Not surprisingly, Table 3 reports that WorkLev_Office is highly 
correlated with an office’s percent of clients that are Large Accelerated Filers. As Percent_LAF 
increases, so do the assets an audit office needs to audit. Further, WorkLev_Office is negatively 
correlated with filing the 10K early.  
Table 4 reports the main results of estimating equation (1) using a Fractional Logistic 
regression. A Fractional Logistic analysis is appropriate, as the dependent variable is a 
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proportional measure including both endpoints of zero and one (King and Zeng 2001).  
<<<Insert Table 4 Here>>> 
In column (1), the table reports that controlling for other client and office characteristics, 
WorkLev_Office is positively associated with restatements (p-value <0.10). This indicates that as 
work demands increase, auditors perform their job with decreasing quality.  
A positive and significant coefficient on Avg_ROA, Avg_Disc_Accrual, Avg_Cash_Flow, 
Avg_M&A, Big4, and Avg_ICW suggests offices with clients with greater return on assets, higher 
discretionary accruals, greater cash flows, more mergers or acquisitions, Big 4 Audit Firms, and 
auditors with clients with more internal control weaknesses are more likely to have a higher 
percentage of misstatements. The negative and significant coefficients on Avg_Leverage and 
Avg_Client_Age suggest audit offices with greater leveraged clients and older clients are less 
likely to misstate the financial statements.  
Column (2) and (3) of Table 4 split the sample on Big 4 and Non-Big 4 audit firms, 
respectively because Big 4 audit firms have greater resources that could potentially mitigate 
negative effects of high workload. The insignificant coefficient on WorkLev_Office in column 
(2) and significant coefficient on WorkLev_Office in column (3) (p- value <0.05) suggests the 
results are driven by offices of Non-Big 4 firms. Big 4 audit firms may be better equipped to 
reallocate employee resources across offices and manage employee utilization more effectively, 
which would support the adaptive cost hypothesis theory. This ability to reallocate employee’s 
efforts would alleviate the cognitive fatigue experienced by the employees. The Non-Big 4 
results indicate a 2.5 percent increase in the odds of a restatement with a standard-deviation 
increase in WorkLev_Office, which supports the cognitive fatigue theory. With a significantly 
negative coefficient on Percent LAF for Non-Big 4 offices, we infer these offices focus audit 
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quality for their largest clients, which hinders their ability in later weeks during busy season for 
the accelerated filer clients. 
The size of Non-Big 4 firms varies widely; therefore, Table 5 separates Non-Big 4 firms 
into Second-Tier firms and other Non-Big 4 firms. We define second-tier firms as those 
additional PCAOB annually inspected firms as opposed to all other triennially inspected firms. 
<<<Insert Table 5 Here>>> 
Results for these cross sections are reported in columns (3) and (4), respectively, of Table 
5. The positive and significant coefficient on WorkLev_Office (p-value <0.01) in column (4) 
depicts that the smaller Non-Big 4 firms are driving the results. The increased coefficient on 
WorkLev_Office in column (4) indicates a 4 percent increase in the odds of restatement for a one 
standard deviation increase in WorkLev_Office for the smaller Non-Big 4 offices.  
We test the linearity of the discovered relation between restatements and WorkLev_Office 
by including tercile measures of our variable of interest, WorkLev_Office, rather than a 
continuous measure. We use the second tercile as the holdout group to note any non-linear trends 
in the first and third quartiles relative to the second. A U or inverse-U shape in the findings 
results in consistently signed coefficients on the first and third tercile indicator variables. 
Coefficients of opposite signs indicates a linear relation. Results of this analysis are reported in 
Table 8. We find negative, albeit insignificant, coefficients on the Tercile 1 indicator, and 
statistically positive coefficient on the Tercile 3 indicator. These results are consistent with a 
positive and linear relation between WorkLev_Office and restatements. 
An additional measure of audit quality is missed internal controls (Rice and Weber 2012). 
We test the relation between WorkLev_Office and missed internal control weaknesses and the 
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results of this analysis are reported in Table 6.  
<<<Insert Table 6 Here>>> 
We find statistically significant positive coefficients for WorkLev_Office at the full 
sample, Big 4, and Non Big 4 office level in columns (1), (2), and (3), respectively (p-value 
<0.05; p-value <0.10; and p-value <0.01, respectively). This is consistent with the cognitive 
fatigue of auditors negatively affecting internal control work as well as financial statement audit 
procedures. While much of the internal control work is performed before busy season, quarterly 
and yearend controls must be tested during busy season and contribute to cognitive fatigue 
during this period. Taken together, the restatement results and the missed internal control 
weakness results indicate workload leverage is negatively associated with audit quality. 
V. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
As a falsification test, we estimate equation (1) for only the non-accelerated clients of 
offices with December 31 yearends. Non-accelerated filer clients are much smaller than 
accelerated clients and have a full month (two weeks) extra to file their audited annual financial 
statements when compared to large accelerated filer clients (accelerated filer clients). With the 
decreased stress due to client size and additional time, we expect the null hypothesis to be more 
credible for non-accelerated clients. 
We report results of equation (1) for non-accelerated filers in Table 7. As predicted, we 
find no association between WorkLev_Office and restatements for the full sample or the Non Big 
4 sample. However, when we split the sample on Big 4 and Non-Big 4, we do find a positive 
association between restatements and WorkLev_Office for Big 4 offices (p-value <0.05). This 
result may be due to Big 4 offices’ cognitive fatigue affecting their smaller clients due to 
prolonged busy seasons extending beyond the accelerated client’s deadlines. This finding is 
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consistent with Big 4 offices focusing their efforts on their largest clients and offering fatigued 
audit inputs to their smaller clients. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This study examines the influence of workload leverage on audit quality for Big 4 and 
Non-Big 4 audit firms throughout busy season. The seasonal increase in workload for public 
accountants has the potential to overstimulate professionals and cause cognitive fatigue (Cohen 
1980). Cognitive fatigue adversely affects job performance and results in lower audit quality. 
However, there have been investments made by audit firms in an attempt to provide work life 
balance in order to mitigate cognitive fatigue (Buchheit et al. 2016). The adaptive cost theory 
suggests the predictability of the increase in workload leverage may mitigate the adverse effects 
of the stress associated with the audit because the busy season period is known and expected by 
audit personnel. Using the total assets per audit personnel in an audit office we examine the 
effect on audit quality using financial statement misstatements and missed internal control 
weaknesses. If auditors experience cognitive fatigue, we would expect to find the workload 
leverage influences audit quality. Alternatively, if the predictability of the increased workload 
mitigates the adverse effects we would not find an association between workload leverage and 
audit quality.  
When examining the association of audit office workload leverage for accelerated clients, 
on audit quality, we find a negative association for Non-Big 4 audit firms. However, when 
examine the association between audit office workload leverage and audit quality for non-
accelerated filers we find a negative association for Big 4 audit firms. These results suggest that 
both Big 4 and Non-Big 4 audit firms experience cognitive fatigue during busy seasons, although 
at different points. This difference may be the result of different resources available to the audit 
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firm to redistribute and reallocate work hours to effectively manage employee utilization rates.  
Our study is limited as our data is not granular enough to identify the number of staff at 
each level of the audit firm (i.e., staff, manager, partner) nor can we identify which clients suffer 
the most workload leverage. We are also not able to track the location of each employee in which 
they work and only have data pertaining to the office in which they are employed. We believe 
future research should consider the allocation of hours among staffing levels within the audit 
firm and the influence of workload leverage at different levels.  
With the reoccurrence of a busy season each year driven by client deadlines, the stressors 
associated with workload will continue for the accounting profession. The PCAOB recognizes 
the challenge the profession faces in order to accommodate simultaneous clients’ deadlines. In a 
2015 Concept Release, the PCAOB suggests workload leverage as an indicator of audit quality. 
Understanding the association of the workload leverage as it relates to audit quality will allow 
regulators to make informed decisions pertaining to the required disclosures. Further, it provides 
additional support for practitioners to develop methods to allocate and manage utilization rates.  
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Table 1
Sample Selection
Number of unique US-based audit office-year pairs identified
from Audit Analytics for the period 2005 - 2014
10,282
Less: Number of office-years located within the same MSA (405)
Less: Number of office-years without Audit Analytics values for
client control variables
(2,841)
Less: Number of office-years without Compustat values for client
control variables, including discretionary accruals
(3,129)
Less: Number of office-years without a December yearend client (746)
3,161
3,161
Less: Number of office-years without a Large Accelerated Filer
client of Accelerated Filer Client
(182)
Final Sample for Accelerated Filer Analysis 2,979
3,161
Less: Number of office-years without a Non-Accelerated Filer Client (325)
Final Sample for Non-Accelerated Filer Analysis 2,836
25
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
N Mean Median Std.Dev. 25% 75%
Avg Office Restatements 2,979 0.07 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.03
WorkLev Office 2,979 19.15 19.31 2.73 17.41 20.85
Competition 2,979 3.99 3.22 2.24 2.08 5.93
Precent LAF 2,979 0.72 0.92 0.37 0.50 1.00
Avg Days Early 2,979 5.59 4.50 5.32 2.33 7.40
Avg NAS Ratio 2,979 0.15 0.14 0.08 0.09 0.19
Avg ROA 2,979 -0.18 0.01 6.37 -0.10 0.04
Avg MtoB 2,979 2.96 3.15 0.94 2.35 3.60
Avg Disc Accruals 2,979 -0.03 -0.02 0.11 -0.06 0.02
Avg Cash Flow 2,979 -0.02 0.06 0.40 -0.02 0.10
Avg Loss 2,979 0.33 0.29 0.30 0.00 0.50
Avg Leverage 2,979 0.25 0.22 0.77 0.12 0.31
Avg Litigation 2,979 0.23 0.15 0.27 0.00 0.36
Avg Client Age 2,979 21.74 19.89 10.94 14.00 27.00
Avg M&A 2,979 0.38 0.38 0.33 0.00 0.58
Big4 2,979 0.66 1.00 0.47 0.00 1.00
Avg ICW 2,979 0.05 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00
Variable definitions located in the text.
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Table 3
Pearson Correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
(1)Avg Office Restatements
(2)WorkLev Office 0.05∗ 1.00
(3)Competition 0.01 −0.01 1.00
(4)Precent LAF 0.03 0.50∗−0.22∗ 1.00
(5)Avg Days Early −0.03 −0.06∗ 0.03 −0.18∗ 1.00
(6)Avg NAS Ratio 0.02 0.12∗−0.03 0.10∗−0.00 1.00
(7)Avg ROA 0.01 0.03 −0.04∗ 0.07∗ 0.01 0.01 1.00
(8)Avg MtoB 0.02 0.50∗−0.21∗ 0.72∗−0.08∗ 0.18∗ 0.08∗ 1.00
(9)Avg Disc Accr 0.02 0.09∗−0.04 0.10∗−0.03 0.03 0.02 0.11∗ 1.00
(10)Avg Cash Flow 0.03 0.17∗−0.15∗ 0.26∗−0.00 0.07∗ 0.58∗ 0.30∗ 0.07∗ 1.00
(11)Avg Loss −0.01 −0.31∗ 0.18∗−0.46∗ 0.01 −0.13∗−0.07∗−0.52∗−0.30∗−0.32∗ 1.00
(12)Avg Leverage −0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 −0.03 −0.02 −0.59∗ 0.01 0.00 −0.49∗ 0.03 1.00
(13)Avg Litigation 0.03 −0.25∗ 0.14∗−0.24∗ 0.02 −0.11∗−0.02 −0.24∗−0.20∗−0.19∗ 0.31∗−0.04∗ 1.00
(14)Avg Client Age −0.01 0.31∗−0.16∗ 0.36∗ 0.02 0.14∗ 0.05∗ 0.41∗ 0.13∗ 0.18∗−0.41∗−0.01 −0.29∗ 1.00
(15)Avg M&A 0.08∗ 0.16∗−0.06∗ 0.27∗−0.06∗ 0.13∗ 0.04∗ 0.26∗ 0.01 0.14∗−0.17∗−0.01 −0.04∗ 0.18∗ 1.00
(16)Big4 0.06∗ 0.55∗−0.29∗ 0.62∗−0.08∗ 0.20∗ 0.06∗ 0.65∗ 0.04∗ 0.24∗−0.39∗ 0.00 −0.15∗ 0.37∗ 0.28∗ 1.00
(17)Avg ICW 0.09∗−0.17∗ 0.14∗−0.23∗ 0.01 −0.05∗−0.05∗−0.22∗−0.04∗−0.12∗ 0.19∗ 0.01 0.14∗−0.11∗−0.03 −0.20∗
∗ p < .05
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Table 4: Restatement at Office Level
(1) (2) (3)
All Big Four Non Big Four
WorkLev Office 0.045∗ (1.71) 0.010 (0.39) 0.133∗∗ (2.00)
Competition 0.028 (1.05) -0.001 (-0.04) 0.022 (0.32)
Percent LAF -0.282 (-1.19) 0.454 (1.36) -1.332∗∗∗ (-2.91)
Avg Days Early -0.009 (-0.82) -0.040∗∗∗ (-2.92) 0.013 (0.65)
Avg NAS Ratio 0.064 (0.09) 0.553 (0.77) -1.325 (-0.81)
Avg ROA 0.031∗∗∗ (2.62) -0.125∗∗∗ (-4.20) 0.043∗∗ (2.30)
Avg MtoB -0.057 (-0.59) -0.120 (-1.27) 0.268 (1.13)
Avg Disc Accruals 1.464∗∗∗ (2.72) 0.738 (0.98) 1.177 (1.23)
Avg Cash Flow 0.426∗∗ (2.20) -0.746 (-1.37) 0.327 (1.08)
Avg Loss 0.234 (0.98) -0.270 (-0.93) 0.294 (0.60)
Avg Leverage -0.470∗∗∗ (-5.02) 1.092∗∗ (2.54) -1.728∗∗∗ (-12.25)
Avg Litigation 0.261 (1.16) 0.163 (0.63) 0.904∗ (1.82)
Avg Client Age -0.266∗∗ (-2.05) -0.094 (-0.68) -0.741∗∗ (-2.48)
Avg M&A 0.557∗∗∗ (3.13) 0.607∗∗∗ (3.25) 1.203∗∗∗ (3.06)
Big4 0.705∗∗∗ (3.96)
Avg ICW 1.595∗∗∗ (3.69) 1.849∗∗∗ (3.05) 1.987∗∗∗ (2.59)
Constant -3.196∗∗∗ (-5.30) -2.866∗∗∗ (-4.12) -3.897∗∗ (-2.49)
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,979 1,970 1,009
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
Sample limited to yearends in December 31 and to Large Accelerated Filers and Accelerated
Filers.
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Table 5: Restatement at Office Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Big Four 2nd Tier Non Big Four
and Non 2nd Tier
WorkLev Office 0.045∗ (1.71) 0.010 (0.39) 0.143 (1.09) 0.284∗∗∗ (2.99)
Competition 0.028 (1.05) -0.001 (-0.04) 0.240∗ (1.84) 0.021 (0.20)
Percent LAF -0.282 (-1.19) 0.454 (1.36) -2.684∗∗∗ (-2.94) -2.254∗∗∗ (-3.46)
Avg Days Early -0.009 (-0.82) -0.040∗∗∗ (-2.92) 0.075∗ (1.72) -0.001 (-0.04)
Avg NAS Ratio 0.064 (0.09) 0.553 (0.77) -3.322 (-1.02) 0.413 (0.17)
Avg ROA 0.031∗∗∗ (2.62) -0.125∗∗∗ (-4.20) -0.096 (-0.09) 0.178∗∗∗ (3.57)
Avg MtoB -0.057 (-0.59) -0.120 (-1.27) 0.556 (1.23) 0.544 (1.52)
Avg Disc Accruals 1.464∗∗∗ (2.72) 0.738 (0.98) 1.299 (0.45) 3.036∗∗ (2.47)
Avg Cash Flow 0.426∗∗ (2.20) -0.746 (-1.37) 6.790∗∗∗ (4.20) -0.280 (-0.71)
Avg Loss 0.234 (0.98) -0.270 (-0.93) -1.082 (-1.19) 1.397∗ (1.95)
Avg Leverage -0.470∗∗∗ (-5.02) 1.092∗∗ (2.54) -2.486∗∗∗ (-8.26) -0.241 (-0.42)
Avg Litigation 0.261 (1.16) 0.163 (0.63) 2.073∗∗ (2.21) 0.463 (0.62)
Avg Client Age -0.266∗∗ (-2.05) -0.094 (-0.68) -1.819∗∗∗ (-2.92) -0.858∗∗ (-2.04)
Avg M&A 0.557∗∗∗ (3.13) 0.607∗∗∗ (3.25) 1.696∗∗ (2.35) 1.504∗∗∗ (2.62)
BigN 0.705∗∗∗ (3.96)
Avg ICW 1.595∗∗∗ (3.69) 1.849∗∗∗ (3.05) 2.413 (1.23) 1.870∗ (1.84)
Constant -3.196∗∗∗ (-5.30) -2.866∗∗∗ (-4.12) -1.708 (-0.54) -7.441∗∗∗ (-3.37)
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,979 1,970 359 650
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
Sample limited to yearends in December 31 and to Large Accelerated Filers and Accelerated Filers.
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Table 6: Missed ICW at Office Level
(1) (2) (3)
All Big Four Non Big Four
WorkLev Office 0.058∗∗ (2.14) 0.047∗ (1.74) 0.240∗∗∗ (3.15)
Competition -0.007 (-0.27) -0.008 (-0.30) -0.129 (-1.62)
Precent LAF -0.278 (-1.15) 0.139 (0.40) -1.266∗∗ (-2.37)
Avg Days Early 0.003 (0.28) -0.038∗∗∗ (-2.71) 0.035 (1.53)
Avg NAS Ratio 0.445 (0.64) 0.466 (0.64) -1.275 (-0.71)
Avg ROA 0.028∗∗ (2.36) -0.163∗∗∗ (-5.27) 0.100∗∗∗ (4.69)
Avg MtoB -0.066 (-0.65) -0.083 (-0.81) -0.058 (-0.20)
Avg Disc Accruals 1.887∗∗∗ (3.51) 1.149 (1.48) 1.550 (1.43)
Avg Cash Flow 0.659∗∗∗ (3.41) -0.269 (-0.48) 0.602∗ (1.73)
Avg Loss 0.328 (1.36) -0.079 (-0.26) 0.204 (0.37)
Avg Leverage -0.744∗∗∗ (-11.72) 0.927∗∗ (2.08) -2.033∗∗∗ (-18.84)
Avg Litigation 0.310 (1.36) 0.128 (0.48) 1.252∗∗ (2.18)
Avg Client Age -0.386∗∗∗ (-2.95) -0.248∗ (-1.71) -0.901∗∗∗ (-2.74)
Avg M&A 0.486∗∗∗ (2.68) 0.597∗∗∗ (3.07) 1.271∗∗∗ (2.81)
Big4 0.605∗∗∗ (3.31)
Constant -2.694∗∗∗ (-4.30) -2.728∗∗∗ (-3.77) -3.707∗∗ (-2.00)
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,048 1,974 1,074
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
Sample limited to yearends in December 31 and to Large Accelerated Filers and Accelerated
Filers.
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Table 7: Restatement at Office Level: Non-Accelerated Filers
(1) (2) (3)
All Big Four Non Big Four
WorkLev Office 0.038 (1.36) 0.091∗∗ (2.52) -0.003 (-0.06)
Competition 0.048 (1.59) -0.013 (-0.34) 0.150∗∗∗ (3.05)
Avg Days Early -0.015∗∗ (-2.34) -0.045∗∗∗ (-5.15) -0.003 (-0.28)
Avg NAS Ratio 0.379 (0.50) -0.007 (-0.01) 0.739 (0.76)
Avg ROA 0.031∗∗∗ (2.77) -1.856∗∗∗ (-46.64) 0.042∗∗∗ (3.30)
Avg MtoB 0.155∗ (1.80) 0.050 (0.39) 0.248∗∗ (2.02)
Avg Disc Accruals 0.429 (1.07) 4.641∗∗∗ (3.88) 0.434 (0.94)
Avg Cash Flow -0.089∗∗ (-2.28) 2.200∗∗∗ (2.63) -0.118∗∗∗ (-2.69)
Avg Loss -0.035 (-0.14) -0.382 (-0.73) -0.020 (-0.06)
Avg Leverage 0.034 (0.40) -0.634 (-1.23) 0.034 (0.36)
Avg Litigation 0.023 (0.11) -0.711 (-1.51) 0.024 (0.09)
Avg Client Age 0.005 (0.04) -0.154 (-0.61) -0.011 (-0.06)
Avg M&A 0.752∗∗∗ (3.46) 0.582∗∗ (2.16) 0.968∗∗∗ (2.65)
Big4 0.062 (0.28)
Avg ICW 0.346 (1.18) 2.985∗∗∗ (2.93) 0.166 (0.49)
Constant -4.061∗∗∗ (-6.43) -2.887∗∗ (-2.56) -4.269∗∗∗ (-4.48)
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,836 1,310 1,526
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
Sample limited to yearends in December 31 and to Non-Accelerated Filers.
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Table 8: Restatement at Office Level: Asset per Auditor Terciles
(1) (2) (3)
All Big Four Non Big Four
WorkLev Office Terc 1 -0.123 (-0.82) -0.025 (-0.18) -0.200 (-0.61)
WorkLev Office Terc 3 0.210 (1.42) 0.184 (1.39) 0.743∗∗ (2.07)
Competition 0.034 (1.29) -0.006 (-0.21) 0.021 (0.32)
Percent LAF -0.303 (-1.28) 0.413 (1.23) -1.427∗∗∗ (-3.18)
Avg Days Early -0.011 (-1.06) -0.042∗∗∗ (-3.10) 0.006 (0.31)
Avg NAS Ratio 0.068 (0.10) 0.572 (0.79) -1.096 (-0.67)
Avg ROA 0.033∗∗∗ (2.73) -0.120∗∗∗ (-4.04) 0.052∗∗∗ (2.80)
Avg MtoB -0.038 (-0.40) -0.134 (-1.42) 0.309 (1.32)
Avg Disc Accruals 1.342∗∗ (2.50) 0.737 (0.98) 0.835 (0.88)
Avg Cash Flow 0.433∗∗ (2.23) -0.720 (-1.32) 0.317 (1.05)
Avg Loss 0.214 (0.90) -0.303 (-1.04) 0.196 (0.41)
Avg Leverage -0.503∗∗∗ (-5.36) 1.091∗∗ (2.54) -1.776∗∗∗ (-12.66)
Avg Litigation 0.241 (1.07) 0.175 (0.68) 0.939∗ (1.92)
Avg Client Age -0.289∗∗ (-2.22) -0.135 (-0.97) -0.817∗∗∗ (-2.75)
Avg M&A 0.596∗∗∗ (3.35) 0.605∗∗∗ (3.25) 1.275∗∗∗ (3.26)
Big4 0.708∗∗∗ (3.97) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.)
Avg ICW 1.596∗∗∗ (3.70) 1.869∗∗∗ (3.08) 2.010∗∗∗ (2.65)
Constant -2.333∗∗∗ (-4.72) -2.477∗∗∗ (-4.22) -1.584 (-1.43)
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,979 1,970 1,009
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
Sample limited to yearends in December 31 and to Large Accelerated Filers and Accelerated
Filers.
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